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KEY POINTS 
• The extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into Lebanon has created a multifaceted 
crisis with several dimensions. 
• Unintended consequences of US and British interventions elsewhere in the ‘war on 
terror’ appear to be framing the battle lines in this Israeli-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict. 
• The US Administration refuses to condemn the Israeli offensive because it reserves the 
right to act in exactly the same way.  And the British Prime Minister has assumed the 
default position in UK-US relations: that by supporting Israel publicly he will have more 
influence privately.   
• The key provisions of the Geneva Conventions do apply to all parties in the current 
conflict in the Middle East: the regular armed forces of Israel, to Hezbollah as an 
organised political Islamist group with a military arm, and to any formal or informal 
Palestinian forces. 
• The NATO Response Force (NRF) could form the main component of an international 
security force for Lebanon, but there are several difficulties with such a deployment that 
still need to be resolved. 
• Disarming the military wing of Hezbollah against its will is not an option, but disruption of 
its lines of re-supply is, as part of an international arms embargo on all shipments of 
weapons to all parties in the war. 
• Key principles for a lasting solution include: the Israeli government must immediately halt 
its attacks on Lebanon and Hezbollah and Hamas must immediately stop shelling or 
otherwise engaging in violence against Israel; the Israeli government, Hezbollah and 
Hamas must adhere strictly to the rules of international humanitarian law, particularly 
with regard to the protection of civilians and rules against the use of indiscriminate 
weapons; and there is a need to address the underlying sense of injustice and insecurity 
felt on both sides. 
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• The United States and Britain have to improve their own moral condition, via a return to 
the rule of law and to the protection of civil liberties, and an end to efforts to escape from 
the obligations of international law in the fight against terrorism.   
 
Introduction 
The war in Lebanon is entering its third week.  The latest round of the conflict began after the 
Lebanese Shiite Muslim group Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers, and killed three others, 
in a cross-border raid on 12 July (following the earlier capture of another Israeli soldier by 
Hamas in late June and the detention by Israel of a number of senior Hamas government 
officials).  The number of dead and wounded in Gaza, Northern Israel and Lebanon are now 
over six hundred – including four unarmed UN observers and 52 villagers, including 30 children, 
killed on 30 July by an Israeli air strike on the Lebanese village of Qana.  The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) puts the number of internally displaced Lebanese in Beirut 
at 65,000.  The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 800,000 Lebanese 
(out of a population of 3.5 million) have now been displaced.  The main concern is for the 
civilians living in Southern Lebanon, who can neither move easily or be supplied safely by the 
relief agencies. 
Crisis talks between US, European and Arab officials in Rome on 26 July failed to agree on an 
immediate plan to force an end to the fighting.  Although officials called for an end to the 
violence, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said any ceasefire must be "sustainable" and 
that there could be "no return to the status quo ante".  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called 
for the formation of a multinational force to help Lebanon assert its authority and implement 
existing UN resolutions that call for Hezbollah to be disarmed.  At a bilateral meeting in 
Washington on 30 July, Tony Blair and George Bush proposed the staged introduction to 
Lebanon of an international security force with a new UN mandate, but continued to refuse to 
endorse calls for an unconditional ceasefire.   
 
What began as a localised conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza quickly 
became a regional conflict after Hezbollah’s capture of the two Israeli soldiers.  The Israeli 
government has responded by carrying out air strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets in 
Lebanon, and Hezbollah has countered with rocket attacks against cities and towns in northern 
Israel.  A ground war in southern Lebanon has also started.  Meanwhile, Israeli clashes with 
Hamas and other Palestinian militants have continued unabated in Gaza. 
 
The extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into Lebanon has created a multifaceted crisis 
with several dimensions: Hamas striving to be accepted as a legitimate government of the 
Palestinian Authority; Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon and its sponsorship by Iran and Syria; the 
ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict; the growing Sunni-Shiite divide in the region; and wider 
international divisions, especially the war of words between Washington and Tehran.  This 
BASIC Paper focuses on the transatlantic dimension to the crisis, which cuts across a number 
of US and British policies in the Middle East.  In particular, some of the unintended 
consequences of US and British interventions elsewhere in the ‘war on terror’ appear to be 
framing the battle lines in this Israeili-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict.  One of the primary 
consequences is the undermining of the Geneva Conventions and other humanitarian law. 
 
The author supports the call being made by many governments and civil society groups: that a 
political solution to the twin crises of Lebanon and Palestine must be the international 
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community’s urgent priority.  This in turn, requires an immediate Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire that 
puts a reciprocal end to attacks.  As the International Crisis Group concludes, “Waiting and 
hoping for military action to achieve its purported goals will have not only devastating 
humanitarian consequences: it will make it much harder to pick up the political pieces when the 
guns fall silent”.1  The international community should also be prepared to contribute a sufficient 
military force with a robust mandate to undertake what a weak or manipulated Lebanon plainly 
can or will not: a zone of security along the southern border with Israel.  
 
US and British Goals in the Crisis 
 
The crisis erupted just before the start of the annual Group of Eight (G-8) heads-of-state 
meeting in Russia.  After lengthy discussions, the G-8 called for Hamas and Hezbollah to 
release the three Israeli soldiers and to stop firing mortars and rockets at Israeli cities, and for 
Israel to cease military operations against Gaza and Lebanon, to withdraw all forces back inside 
Israel, and release Palestinian government officials arrested earlier.  However, the Bush 
Administration has interpreted the G-8 statement as requiring Hamas and Hezbollah to return 
the soldiers and cease shelling first, after which Israel would halt its operations.  Since the 
statement does not specify a sequence, this US interpretation is at odds with the other summit 
participants—with the exception of Britain. 
 
The G-8 division was replicated at the Rome Summit, with the United Nations, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Canada and Cyprus in 
favour of an immediate ceasefire and the United States and Britain opposed.  What are the 
reasons behind the US-UK stance? 
 
The US Administration has repeatedly stated its unequivocal support for Israel’s intervention in 
Lebanon and President Bush has charged that “the root cause of the problem is Hezbollah... 
And part of those terrorist attacks are inspired by nation states, like Syria and Iran.”  Thus, while 
many in the international community have called for an immediate ceasefire, US and British 
officials have refrained from backing this demand, ostensibly to allow Israel to conduct its 
extensive military campaign to weaken Hezbollah.  This would also seem to support US 
Administration goals of creating a “new” democratic and pro-Western Middle East, where 
necessary, with force.  Seeking to split Syria off from Iran by striking a deal with Damascus may 
well be the next big US strategic chess move.2 
 
The United States and Israel presently share a similar approach to security: an emphasis on 
unilateral, overpowering force or the threat of such force to try to establish absolute security 
from attack or even intimidation from others.  It has been clear since the beginning of the Israeli 
military offensive in Lebanon that the US Administration would not condemn it because it 
reserves the right to act in exactly the same way if its own citizens, and especially its military 
forces, are seized or some other act against US interests ‘requires’ a military response.  The 
Bush Administration is not about to limit its own potential for action by condemning Israeli use of 
force.  But just as the ‘preventive war’ in Iraq failed to make the United States more secure in 
the world, the disproportionate response by the Israeli military to Hezbollah’s provocation will 
also weaken the chances of achieving the peace and security that Israelis crave.3  Nonetheless, 
these are policies that, for the time being, have widespread support in both Israel and the United 
States. 
On July 20, for example, the US House of Representatives, voted by an overwhelming 410-8 
margin to unconditionally endorse Israel's ongoing attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.  The 
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Senate passed a similar resolution earlier in the week by a voice vote, but included a clause that 
“urges all sides to protect innocent civilian life and infrastructure”.  By contrast, the House 
version omits this section and even praises Israel for “minimizing civilian loss”, despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.   
As Stephen Zunes, professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco argues, the 
resolution reveals a bipartisan US consensus on the legitimacy of allies to disregard 
international legal norms.  He also points out that the resolution radically reinterprets the UN 
Charter by claiming that Israel's attacks on Lebanon's civilian infrastructure are an act of 
legitimate self-defence under Article 51, concluding that, “In short, both Democrats and 
Republicans are now on record that, in the name of “fighting terrorism,” US allies—and, by 
extension, the United States as well—can essentially ignore international law and inflict 
unlimited damage on the civilian infrastructure of a small and largely defenceless country, even 
a pro-Western democracy like Lebanon”.4  
Even if Hezbollah is conducting a proxy war for Tehran, and only has an army with a notional 
strength of around 2,0005 which uses Lebanon as a human shield, what chance of success do 
ground and air attacks on Lebanon have, except in fuelling anti-Israeli sentiment and further 
sectarian violence?  And by unwittingly targeting one of the best hopes of civilized life in the 
Middle East (outside of Israel itself), the Israeli Defence Force is creating a moral and 
institutional vacuum in Lebanon in which Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups will 
prosper. 
And what of Britain’s motives for endorsing the US line?  The Prime Minister will no doubt 
argue that by supporting Israel publicly he will have more influence privately.  This is also his 
default position in UK-US relations, with equally mixed results.  But private pressure is a two-
way street.  There is also undoubtedly US pressure applied to the UK government, as part of 
the quid-pro quo of the ‘Special Relationship’, to keep the UK ‘on-message’ in any public 
pronouncements or negotiations on the wider Israeli-Arab dispute.  Israel is also Britain’s third 
largest trading partner in the Middle East, so there is also a measure of economic self-interest 
within Whitehall.  
But unlike the near US congressional consensus, there is a growing parliamentary revolt against 
Tony Blair's handling of the Middle East crisis that even extends to members of his Cabinet.  
Jack Straw, Leader of the House of Commons and former Foreign Secretary, has described 
Israeli attacks on Lebanon as "disproportionate" and accused Tel Aviv of escalating an "already 
dangerous situation".  Opinion polls in Britain also suggest that the Prime Minister is out of step 
with the public on the closeness of Britain’s relationship with the White House.  
 
At what point then does Downing Street publicly part company with the White House?  Only at 
the margins it would seem.  It has been reported that Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Margaret 
Beckett talked to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the Rome Summit about 
allegations that Prestwick airport in Scotland had been used as a staging post by US planes 
transporting bunker-busting bombs to Israel.  Margaret Beckett told Channel 4 News: "We will 
be making a formal protest [to the United States] if it appears that that is what has happened".  
But the condemnation and subsequent apology was more about the process rather than the 
substance, and a further six flights carrying military supplies for Israel have allegedly passed 
through UK airports since.  It has also been suggested that Defence Secretary Des Browne 
(himself a Scot) offered the use of English airports following protests by Scottish Secretary 
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Douglas Alexander about the use of Prestwick Airport.  The only other alternative is Shannon 
airport in Ireland, but the Irish government has refused to allow these flights to land on its soil. 6 
 
Self-Defence and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ was first comprehensively outlined in a 2001 
report by the Canadian-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
which aimed to reconcile sovereignty and the international concern for gross human rights 
violations.  In short, it sought to provide a legal and ethical basis for ‘humanitarian intervention’: 
the intervention by external actors (preferably the international community through the United 
Nations) in a state that is unwilling or unable to fight genocide, massive killings and other 
massive human rights violations.  This intervention should be the exercise of diplomatic and 
then, if necessary, coercive (including forceful) steps to protect civilians.  The 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document endorsed the R2P concept, and in April 2006, the UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.  
Resolution 1674 contains the historic first official Security Council reference to the responsibility 
to protect: it “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity”. 
So who is responsible for the protection of civilians in the Lebanon crisis?  The following extract 
from a blog on the UK Overseas Development Institute’s Web site seeks to draw out some 
answers: 
While the emphasis of the R2P doctrine has tended towards internal conflict, a key question in 
the context of the current crisis in the Middle East is what responsibility does the international 
community have in ensuring that civilians are protected in international conflicts as well?      
 
In this case, the Government of Lebanon is evidently unable to prevent either the activities of 
Hizbollah or the retaliatory actions of Israel.  The civilian population of Lebanon (and parts of 
Israel) are caught in the middle of this.  Whether or not Israel is legally justified in its actions 
under the self-defence provisions of the UN Charter (Article 51) - or in lawyers' terms, whether it 
is justified under the ius ad bellum - its actions are contrary to the basic principles of the Geneva 
Conventions or the ius in bello.  These require that a distinction be drawn between civilian and 
military targets; that due precaution be exercised to prevent incidental damage to civilians and 
civilian objects; and that any such damage be proportionate to the anticipated military advantage 
gained. Israel's actions arguably fail all of these tests.  
 
What would the R2P doctrine require of other states in this case? Surely as a minimum that 
breaches of humanitarian law on both sides be condemned, and that steps be taken to put an 
end to such practice by whatever means necessary. Hizbollah itself has made the distinction 
between military and civilian objects difficult, and should be condemned for doing so - as they 
should for their indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli targets. But this cannot justify the 
indiscriminate nature of the Israeli response. Even if a state acts in self-defence, it is still bound 
by jus in bello to exercise restraint and avoid civilian casualties and damage to civilian 
infrastructure. The number of civilian casualties, the attack of the civilian airport in Beirut and 
Israel's air and sea blockade on Lebanon constitute a breach of those humanitarian obligations. 
Considering the inability of the Lebanese government to protect its civilians, does the 
international community not share a collective responsibility to protect civilians by getting Israel - 
through persuasion or otherwise - to moderate its actions? And can it be conscionable in these 
circumstances not to support calls for an immediate ceasefire? 7 
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The ICRC, long recognised as the guardian of the Geneva Conventions (a long-standing legal 
base for the R2P doctrine) on the conduct of war, has also declared that Israel has violated the 
principle of proportionality in the conventions as well as the prohibition against collective 
punishment.  Similarly, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour—who served 
as chief prosecutor in the international war crimes tribunals on Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia—has gone on record as suggesting that the armed forces of both Hezbollah and the 
Israeli government may have been engaging in war crimes.8 
An international prosecution of any current war crimes being committed in Lebanon would 
require a UN Security Council Resolution in order to establish another ad hoc Tribunal.  The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) established on the basis of the Rome Statute came into force 
in 2002.  So far 100 states have ratified and acceded to the Rome Statute.  Neither the United 
States nor Israel are treaty-states and they do not intend to become parties to the treaty and do 
not see any legal obligations arising out of their signature of the Rome Statute.  The ICC is 
currently investigating the situation in Darfur, Uganda and Congo but it will most probably not 
receive the cases of Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories. 
In addition, a dangerous precedent of discarding the Geneva Conventions has already been set 
by the Bush administration in its misguided ‘war on terror’.  In January 2002 US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that prisoners detained in the Afghanistan intervention 
would be considered “unlawful combatants” and that “unlawful combatants do not have any 
rights under the Geneva Convention”.  However, the US repudiation of the Conventions goes 
beyond a denial of its provisions to suspect insurgents captured in Afghanistan, Iraq or via 
‘rendition’ (and the recent US Supreme Court decision in the Hamdan v Rumsfeld case has 
invalidated that particular presumption9).  Just as significantly, the United States has 
increasingly failed to follow the principle of proportionality in dealing with the insurgencies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  While the initial combat phase of the invasion of Iraq arguably met this 
requirement by most standards, with US officials proudly extolling the virtues of the Geneva 
Conventions and their compliance with them, the subsequent counter-insurgency operations in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq have increasingly been conducted with disregard for the welfare and 
dignity of noncombatants.   
Of course, the scrutiny as to the proper conduct of the use of force is not limited to the US 
forces in Iraq.  NATO’s intervention in Kosovo invited such scrutiny for the exclusive use of high-
altitude bombing, the use of cluster bombs and the bombing of dual-use targets such as power 
grids.  And the Russian President’s call for proportionality in the Lebanon crisis sounds hollow in 
the light of the Russian military’s own lack of proportionality in combating political violence in 
Chechnya.  
All of these precedents make it more difficult to hold the parties to account in the Lebanon crisis.  
Nonetheless, the key provisions of the Conventions do apply to all parties in the current conflict 
in the Middle East: the regular armed forces of Israel, to Hezbollah as an organized political 
Islamist group with a military arm, and to any formal or informal Palestinian forces.  In particular, 
Article 3 of The Geneva Conventions should be upheld, disseminated, applied and enforced by 
all political leaders, and especially by those like President Bush and Prime Minister Blair who 
claim to be working towards higher moral goals.  Article 3 reads as follows: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
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wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of 
hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected 
and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further 
endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions 
of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal 
status of the Parties to the conflict. 
It should be the responsibility of all Western states to do all within their powers to make these 
lofty texts stick.  Making all military forces and armed movements apply Article 3 and uphold the 
R2P doctrine will mitigate the horror of this –- or any –- war.   
 
A Multinational Peacekeeping Force: A Role for NATO’s Rapid Response Force? 
 
The Rome summit ended in failure, issuing only a joint statement in support of sending an 
international force into Lebanon under a UN mandate but without any specifics of which 
countries might contribute troops.  France and Spain have indicated that they may send troops 
depending on the mandate and rules of engagement.  And it has been suggested forces from 
Turkey, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia might 
supplement these.  Tony Blair and George Bush also floated the idea of a staged introduction of 
an international force in Lebanon at their meeting on 30 July, but were vague on specifics.  An 
earlier article in the New York Post suggested that this might be in two stages: an initial force of 
10,000 troops, predominantly from Muslim countries, which would enter Lebanon as soon as a 
ceasefire was declared, to be followed by a larger force of up to 30,000 troops after about 90 
days.  
 
Part of the current problem in southern Lebanon arises from the failure of the existing 
international force, the UN’s Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil), which was created in 1978 to 
confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and help the 
Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in the area.  One option is to expand Unifil, 
by increasing the number and caliber of its troops (currently just under 2,000), and give it a 
more robust peace enforcement mandate, including responsibility for enforcing UN Resolution 
1559, which calls for "the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias".  
 
In theory, the NATO Response Force (NRF) could form the main component of that larger force.  
NATO claims that it is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, 
sea and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed.  It is 
said to be capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations, 
including evacuations, disaster management, counter-terrorism, and acting as ‘an initial entry 
force’ for larger, follow-on forces.  At present, the force numbers about 17,000 troops, but it is 
set to reach full operational capability in October this year, when it will number some 25,000 
troops and be able to start to deploy after five days’ notice and sustain itself for operations 
lasting 30 days or longer if re-supplied.  General James Jones, the NATO military commander, 
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has said that if the Alliance was asked to play a peacekeeping role in Lebanon, it would be up to 
the job.10 
 
In practice, however, there are several difficulties with such a deployment.  First, the United 
States has already said that it will not contribute troops and the Alliance already has a major 
out-of-area mission in Afghanistan (where it has 24,000 troops committed).  Second, NATO is 
likely to be seen as a tool of Western (and therefore Israeli interests), rather than a neutral force 
for peace and stability.  Third, if the mandate is a robust one, which authorises the forced 
disarmament of Hezbollah, it could end up becoming an unwitting party to Lebanon’s sectarian 
battles.  Rather, the mandate will need to be more limited: restoring the authority of the 
Lebanese army over the south of the country and denying Hezbollah the freedom of operation it 
currently enjoys.  The disarmament of Lebanon's rogue militia, as envisaged in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1559, while necessary in the long term, will have to wait for a political 
settlement. 
 
But while disarming the military wing of Hezbollah against its will—whether attempted by NATO 
(or any other international military force)—-is not an option, disruption of its lines of re-supply 
certainly is.  Based on the experiences of interdiction exercises within the Proliferation Security 
Initiative and in preventing arms smuggling in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans, NATO 
could police the Lebanese ports and the Syrian border posts through which arms are shipped to 
Hezbollah.  Such land and sea interdictions would not prevent all the illicit arms getting through, 
but could be rigorous enough to satisfy Israeli concerns.  However, such a strategy would also 
need to be part of an international arms embargo on all shipments of weapons to all parties in 
the war, including the supply of US and UK weapons and components to Israel.11  
 
As part of a lasting settlement a role will also need to found for Hezbollah’s guerrilla forces.  The 
eventual disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of these forces may also entail 
some elements being absorbed into the Lebanese army.  While such thinking may appear 
premature, history suggests that many conflicts have re-ignited due to the failure or part-failure 
to implement effective DDR programmes once a peace accord has been established.  Both 
political and financial resources need to be earmarked now for when a peacetime DDR 
programme in Lebanon may be possible.  Again, NATO has experience from the Balkans of 
designing and implementing DDR programmes alongside weapons collection and destruction 
programmes. 
 
Another alternative to a NATO-led peacekeeping force is an EU military force under UN 
auspices, which is said to be the Israeli preference.  But Britain and Germany have already said 
they will not contribute soldiers, the former because of overstretch and the latter for sound 
historical reasons.  Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, hinted at the difficulties during the 
Rome Summit, when he said: "It's a real possibility. It is not an easy force to deploy but we have 
been working to try to construct a concept".   
 
Towards a Lasting Solution: Some Key Principles 
 
1. The Israeli government must immediately halt its attacks on Lebanon.  These attacks are 
utterly disproportionate to the initial provocation by Hezbollah, have killed over 600 civilians, 
displaced half a million people, destroyed billions of dollars of Lebanon's infrastructure, and will 
not, in the long run, secure peace or security for Israel.  By attacking Lebanon, the Israeli 
government has assumed a moral and legal responsibility for the well-being of the Lebanese 
people both during hostilities and with respect to the stabilisation and reconstruction of the 
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country thereafter.  The Israeli government should also supply food, electricity, water and funds 
to repair the humanitarian crisis caused by its invasion of Gaza. 
 
2. Hezbollah and Hamas must immediately stop shelling or otherwise engaging in violence 
against Israel.  These actions, which have killed over 50 Israeli civilians, terrorised the people of 
Israel and damaged many towns and cities, played a central role in provoking the current crisis, 
and achieve nothing but harm for the cause of Palestinian and Lebanese independence and 
democracy.    
 
3. The Israeli government, Hezbollah and Hamas must adhere strictly to the rules of 
international humanitarian law, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians and rules 
against the use of indiscriminate weapons.  International humanitarian law prohibits direct 
attacks on civilians or civilian objects, attacks that do not distinguish between military targets 
and civilians or civilian objects, and attacks which, although aimed at a military target, have a 
disproportionate impact on civilians or civilian objects.  There should also be no attack on 
infrastructure even if used for military purposes, if the incidental short-term and long-term 
consequences for civilians would be disproportionate to the concrete and direct military 
advantage sought in the specific attack.   
 
4. Any agreement will require two initial steps: a prisoner swap and an understanding between 
all parties (Hezbollah included) that the current UN presence in South Lebanon will be 
strengthened with a multinational peacekeeping force.  Israel must release the Hamas 
politicians it currently has imprisoned, and Hamas and Hezbollah need to release the three 
Israeli prisoners.  An urgent review of other prisoners held in Israel should also be undertaken.  
Injection of a multinational peacekeeping force carries considerable risk since it could trigger a 
deadly civil conflict, but in the absence of a strong Lebanese army, and given legitimate Israeli 
concerns, it has become a regrettable necessity.  Whether it has a limited mandate (principally 
verifying adherence to the ceasefire) or a more robust mandate (to oversee the disarmament of 
Hezbollah) will largely depend on the terms of any agreement.  A limited mandate is likely to be 
the best that can be agreed initially. 
 
5. The flow of arms into the region to parties engaged in the conflict is a defining factor that fans 
the flames.  Both sides have pointed to the sponsorship of the other by forces external to the 
locality (such as US supply of over $3bn in military aid to Israel, supply of rockets and other 
military material to Hezbollah by Iran and Syria).  The international community should place an 
immediate embargo on all shipments of weapons to all parties in the war (including Syria and 
Iran), and join an international conference to provide security on the border between Israel and 
Lebanon.  It will also require the quick imposition of robust sanctions against any party that 
refuses to sign or violates these agreements. 
 
6. By endorsing Israel's attacks and explicitly giving it time to complete its military operations, 
the US government has become a party to this violence, which, together with American military 
actions in Iraq, is sure to create enmity towards the United States and Israel in the Muslim world 
for generations to come.  Such enmity will also be directed towards the United Kingdom, where 
the government continues to be paired with US policy in the region.  The UK government’s 
failure to condemn out of hand the atrocities on both sides is disappointing.  The UK 
government has a responsibility, within the special relationship, to bring alternative viewpoints to 
Washington and indeed to put pressure on Washington to listen to the will of the international 
community on this issue. 
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7. Getting Hamas and Hezbollah to drop their goal of annihilating Israel will be essential if these 
two organisations are to enter normal relations at some point.  To do this, the international 
community must recognise the elected officials in both Palestine and Lebanon and deal with 
them as representatives of the people who voted for them.  When Hamas was first elected, for 
example, there was a golden opportunity to welcome the organisation into legitimate politics, to 
entice them away from violence and threat, and to give them a stake in engagement (as 
happened with a number of Arab states and indeed the PLO in the past).  Instead, by following 
a strategy of isolating both organisations, the international community has alienated not just the 
extremists, but also the populations that voted for them.   
 
8. There is also a need to address the underlying sense of injustice and insecurity felt on both 
sides.  Hezbollah and Hamas both seek the destruction of the state of Israel, while Israel itself 
shows very little commitment to a truly independent Palestinian state, with proper borders 
negotiated in terms of the road map.  There is need to get all parties to accept a genuine two-
state solution.  This will entail reaching agreement on mutual recognition of borders and rights to 
exist, recognition of each other’s democratic legitimacy and recognition of universal human 
rights and equality of treatment and opportunity.  Any international peace conference will also 
need to include all the relevant actors, including Iran and Syria, and should attempt a Grand 
Bargain that all parties are required to sign up to (which would include recognition of Israel and 
a settlement once and for all of its borders).  Once the other parts of a lasting peace have been 
set in place, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be established, following the model 
used in South Africa. 
9. Finally, the United States and Britain have to improve their own moral condition, a change 
that would be well received abroad.  This would mean a return to the rule of law and to the 
protection of civil liberties, and an end to efforts to escape from the obligations of international 
law in the fight against terrorism. 12  Washington and London should also throw their weight 
behind restarting the Middle East peace process as a matter of urgency.  
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